



Military Daily News

Critics warn that Section 224 could deepen both countries' military ties, which may be difficult to reverse.

2027 NDAA Provision Seeks Sweeping US-Israel Defense Tech Integration



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By [Haley Fuller](#)

Jun 3, 2026, 5:00 AM EDT



Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived at the White House in Washington, Monday.

As he arrives at the West Wing of the White House, White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre (left) and White House chief of staff Mark Schiefelbein (right) greet him.

A provision tucked into the Fiscal Year 2027 defense bill would require the defense secretary to designate an executive agent to coordinate U.S.-Israel defense technology research, development, testing, evaluation, integration and industrial cooperation beyond traditional aid and



the administration's draft version of the bill would move the relationship beyond traditional military aid and into a far deeper system of defense-industrial integration.


Section 224 of the [drafted National Defense Authorization Act](#) (NDAA), the "United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative," would require the defense secretary to designate an executive agent to coordinate U.S.-Israel defense technology research, development, testing, evaluation, integration and industrial cooperation. It specifically describes the provision as covering bilateral defense technology work, integration and industrial cooperation.

Supporters view the proposal as a way to strengthen cooperation between two longtime security partners while critics argue it would move the relationship beyond traditional military aid and into a far deeper system of defense-industrial integration that would be harder for Congress, taxpayers, and even future administrations, to monitor or unwind. The U.S. and Israel jointly struck Iran on Feb. 28, leading to the ongoing war in the Middle East that has enveloped multiple nations.

Ben Freeman, director of the Democratizing Foreign Policy program at the Quincy Institute, warned in [Responsible Statecraft](#) that “Congress quietly moves to integrate US and Israeli militaries,” adding that the measure could intertwine the two countries’ military sectors at a level not previously seen in any U.S. allyship.

Freeman told Military.com that the provision reaches across “seemingly every area of defense tech,” including artificial intelligence, quantum technology, autonomous systems, directed energy, cyber and biotechnology. He said the most alarming terms were “network integration” and “data fusion,” since the bill does not clearly define them.

Credit: Source: Quincy Institute.



Ben Freeman is director of the Democratizing Foreign Policy program at the Quincy Institute.

The proposal also arrives as senior American and Israeli officials increasingly discuss moving beyond the traditional aid framework. On June 1, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee wrote on X that a future U.S.-Israel security agreement would move away from direct aid, stating, “New MOU w/ Israel ends aid & will be based on trade.”

The statement echoed previous comments from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli officials advocating a gradual transition away from direct military assistance and toward joint projects and defense cooperation.

Freeman argues that this shift is not simply a change in accounting. It represents a fundamental change in how the relationship operates.

'Sky is the Limit'

The United States and Israel currently operate under a [10-year memorandum of understanding](#) that runs from fiscal 2019 through FY 2028 and provides \$3.3 billion per year in foreign military financing, plus \$500 million per year for missile defense cooperation.

That aid model has long been controversial, but it is at least visible. Congress can debate it, lawmakers can try to condition it, and the public can understand the top-line number.

Freeman argued that Section 224 points toward something different: Moving support out of the foreign-aid framework and into Pentagon procurement, licensing, co-production and research channels.

That shift matches a broad trend in the defense industry, as seen in a Quincy Institute brief, "The Disappearing Act: How the Defense Industry is Losing Traditional Grant Funding." Instead, support is moving into procurement programs, sustainment



Reserve and Guard leaders speak with 25 HASC staff members to outline readiness challenges and legislative priorities, aiming to inform work on the upcoming national defense bill at the Rayburn House Office Building. (DVIDS)

Freeman said that matters because the new model would be harder for ordinary Americans to see or influence. Aid is capped by a memorandum of understanding and publicly appropriated, but procurement and industrial cooperation can expand through numerous contracts, programs and partnerships spread across different parts of the Defense Department.

Under the aid model, he said, "If you have a military actions can call a member of Congress and say, 'Hello, Pete, I need to order the procurement model, "You have no one to go to."

"You basically have to call the president and say, 'Hello, Pete Hegseth, please stop doing this.'"

The transparency concern is sharpened by the Pentagon's own accounting problems. The Defense Department completed its seventh consecutive department-wide [financial statement audit](#) in 2024 without receiving a clean opinion, while stating that it aims to achieve an unmodified audit opinion by the end of 2028.

Freeman said that if U.S. support for Israel is spread across contracts, data-sharing arrangements, licensing agreements and joint ventures, "There is no upper bound for the level of cooperation here."

"The sky is the limit," he said. "It would be all but impossible to come up with a full estimate of exactly how much U.S. money is going to Israel."

Data Fusion and Intelligence Risks

Perhaps the most controversial part of the 2024 provision involves “network integration” and “data fusion.” Freeman said that ambiguity defines either term.

“I take it as meaning the Israeli military's data,” he said, adding that his concern is over technology-sharing.

In 2020, the U.S. Army acquired two Israeli-made Iron Dome batteries. However, Army officials later concluded that the system could not be fully integrated into the Army's broader air and missile defense architecture.

After providing the equipment, [Israel was unwilling to provide source code](#) and technical information necessary for full integration. The Army ultimately decided not to pursue additional Iron Dome purchases.

To Freeman, that history raises an obvious question. If Israel previously resisted sharing critical technical information with the United States, what guarantees exist that future data-sharing arrangements would be fully reciprocal?

The Jobs Trap

Freeman believes the move to strip the House of Section 224 may have nothing to do with technology.

Section 224 could encourage the expansion of co-production facilities, joint ventures and other arrangements in the United States. Once those jobs exist, they belong to the United States.

Freeman called that possibility “the real Trojan horse” in the proposal. He argued that Israeli firms could replicate the familiar American defense-industry strategy of spreading production across congressional districts, making lawmakers reluctant to oppose programs that support local employment.



Former Vice President Mike Pence speaks at the the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) 2020 Conference, Monday, March 2, 2020 in Washington. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon)

The F-35 program offers "a massive industrial base" of suppliers and jobs. Lockheed Martin and its partners create political support that makes the program

Freeman compared that dynamic to what could happen if Israeli defense firms build deeper U.S. manufacturing footprints.

"They would put that on top of what is already, arguably, the most powerful special interest in all of U.S. politics," he said. "It would put the Israel lobby on steroids."

The issue is not hypothetical. Recent reporting has already identified Israeli-linked defense manufacturing and drone production inside the United States, including facilities connected to companies [such as XTEND](#).

Hard to Unwind

Freeman points to Turkey's [removal from the F-35 program](#) as an example of how difficult defense-industrial disentanglement can be.

After Ankara was expelled from the program over its purchase of Russia's S-400 air defense system, the Pentagon spent years shifting production away from Turkish suppliers that had been manufacturing hundreds of F-35 components. The

transition required finding ways to integrate the two defense sectors, restructuring portions of the supply chain, and ensuring that the integration is fully removed from the pipeline before Turkey could be fully removed from the pipeline.

That was one program. It was a single program that was multiple domains at once.

Freeman argued that if Israel later took actions that caused Washington to reconsider the relationship, disentangling the two defense sectors could take years and create real national security costs.

A Dangerous Time to Integrate

[Recent Middle East diplomacy](#) shows why deeper integration is risky.

President Donald Trump said Israel and Hezbollah had agreed to reduce hostilities, but Netanyahu said Israel would continue “to operate as planned” in southern Lebanon unless Hezbollah stopped its attacks. Trump reportedly lashed out at Netanyahu, calling him “crazy,” according to Axios.



Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a ceremony commemorating Israel's Remembrance Day for fallen soldiers, or Yom HaZikaron, at the Military Cemetery on Mount Herzl in Jerusalem, Tuesday April 21, 2026. (Ilia Yefimovich/Pool Photo via AP)

Iran then halted communications with mediators, according to Iranian reports, while Trump said talks were continuing.

To Freeman, the episode proves that U.S. and Israeli interests are not always compatible.

“Netanyahu is proving right now that Israel’s interests are not always America’s interests,” he said. “Trump is trying to negotiate an end to this conflict, and Netanyahu—over and over again—is doing things that violate the ceasefires and make ending the conflict impossible.”

A Shift in Public Opinion

That concern comes as [polls](#) show Americans' sympathies for Israel.

[Gallup reported](#) in February that Americans' sympathies, with Palestinians than Is

Palestinians in
w sympathizing more

In May 2026, an [Institute for Global Affairs poll](#) found that only 16% of Americans want the United States to keep supplying Israel with weapons without new restrictions, while 38% want weapons transfers stopped entirely and 24% want them conditioned on how they are used. Among Republicans, 35% back unrestricted supply, 29% want conditions, and 18% want to halt supply entirely.

On the other hand, some lawmakers have pushed institutional links beyond procurement. [In 2024, H.R. 8445](#) proposed extending certain protections under federal law to U.S. citizens serving in the Israel Defense Forces.

Freeman said he has seen bipartisan concern about Section 224, including interest from figures on the right and left.

His plea to Congress was direct: "The American people don't want it. Listen to your constituents, not your lobbyists. Strip out Section 224 from the NDAA."

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ll, stay on topic and adhere to our

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Rosalyn

2026-06-03 17:13:58

The bill and Section 224 appears to show that the US military is mainly interested in guaranteeing the benefits of Israel's advanced military technology. Your article complains that Israel withheld technological information on the Iron Dome. Why would they share that without any formal agreements between both countries? But true to form, the article's purpose is an attack on Israel rather than an explanation of how Israeli technology benefits the US and why a formal agreement of cooperation is a necessary step as Israel becomes independent from US funding.

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John

2026-06-04 09:47:15

If Israeli "advanced technology" is so great, why did they need the US to shield them from Iran?

If America wants tech that actually works on the battlefield they should look to Ukraine, not Israel.

The former has held back a modern military for over four years. The latter struggles against non-state actors.

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Phranq

2026-06-05 19:24:42

Having a blank check from America to fund their Israeli military and integrate into our surveillance system is NOT furthering 'i
around Congressional (anc
(Edited)

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Richard

2026-06-07 15:47:01

The article relies entirely on the isolationist and anti-Israel Quincy Institute, rather than giving a balanced account of the potential benefits to the US

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


John

2026-06-09 21:05:38

Like what? Giving them our tech to sell to China so they don't have to go through the effort of stealing it?

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